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JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS: THEIR USE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
PATRICK M WALL
The author, a member of the New York Bar, is Law Clerk to Judge Joseph A. Sarafite of the
Court of General Sessions of New York County. He received both his LL.B. and his LL.M. from
New York University Law School, where he is currently a candidate for the J.S.D. degree.
Counsel for the defense in a criminal case may sometimes prefer that the defendant admit a fact
involved in the prosecution's case rather than have the prosecution present to the jury evidence relating to the fact. In what circumstances may a judicial admission be particularly useful to the
defendant? When may the prosecutor employ a judicial admission to prevent defense counsel from
presenting evidence? And how do the courts rule when, despite a defendant's or prosecutor's judicial
admission of a fact, the other nevertheless chooses to present his evidence of the fact? Mr. Wall
discusses these questions and other related matters in the following article, which reviews and evaluates the case law with respect to the use of judicial admissions in attempting to prevent the presentation of evidence.-EDIToR.

One of the most important tasks of defense
counsel in a criminal case is to prevent the introduction of evidence prejudicial to the defendant.
The task is often an impossible one: witness the
plight of counsel who must put on the witness
stand an accused with prior convictions. If he
does so, then, by the almost unanimous American
rule, the prosecutor may introduce evidence of
the prior crimes.' The jury will be instructed, of
course, that it may use this evidence only for the
purpose of determining the credibility of the accused, and not as an indication, that he is the
type of person who would commit the crime
charged. However, as Judge Learned Hand once
stated in describing a similar limiting instruction,
this is t "recommendation to the jury of a mental
gymnastic which is beyond not only their powers,
2
but anybody's else."
Similar problems may present themselves at
I See 1 WIGmoRE, EViDENcE §61 (3d ed. 1940); 3 id.
§890; McCozsncK, EviDENCE §43, at 93-94 (1954).
The general rule in Pennsylvania, however, is to the
contrary. Id. at 94 & n.38. And UNroiFm RurE oF
EvroENcE 21 provides in part, "If the witness be the
accused in a criminal proceeding, no evidence of his
conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole
purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has first
introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose
of supporting his credibility."
SNash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006,1007 (2d Cir.),
cet. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). See also the remarks
of Circuit Judge Hastie, concurring in United States
v. Price, 258 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir:), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 922 (1958): "Because men often cannot or will
not channel their thinking as directed by another
person, even a learned, solemn and berobed judge,
there is always some risk that legally improper considerations, if known to the jurors, will influence their
verdict."

many stages of the trial. The prosecutor may seek
to introduce, on any one of a number of recognized
theories of admissibility, evidence highly prejudicial to the accused. Often, defense counsel's only
recourse is to request the judge to give proper
limiting instructions to the jury. In some situations, however, defense counsel may have a far
more formidable weapon in his arsenal-a formal
judicial admission or stipulation of the fact which
the prejudicial matter tends to prove.
It is quite clear that such an admission of the
factum probandum will dispense with the necessity
of its proof. The almost universal rule in the
United States was stated thusly by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"[When a fact, even of great importance, is
admitted by the defendant or his counsel in
open court during the trial, that fact is established by the admission, and no. evidence need
3
be given in relation to it.'
In such a case, defendant is bound by the admission, and the prosecutor may safely fail to introduce evidence in support of the fact.4 A problem
arises, however, where the prosecutor prefers to
resort to his prbof; the issue then is whether the
admission can prevent him from doing so. A review of the cases indicates that a large majority
of courts leave the question to the discretion of the
3People v.Walker, 198 N.Y. 329, 335, 91 N.E. 806,
808 (1910).
4State v. WoQd, 99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl. 697 (1926). The
rule is not one-sided. It has been held error for a judge
to submit to the jury, as controverted, matters which
had been the subject of a formal admission by the
prosecutor. People v. Blanck, 212 App. Div. 578, 209
N.Y. Supp. 459 (lst Dept. 1925).
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trial judge, 5 as Wigmore has advised,6 and, in
effect, allow the prosecutor to ignore the admis7
sion and introduce his proof.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that
the courts, in deciding this issue, have often done
so on doubtful theories and with an excessively
optimistic opinion of the jury's ability to make
fine distinctions and to decide fairly in the face of
prejudicial evidence. Situations where the issue
has arisen will be illustrated, and occasionally
suggestions will be made as to the areas in which
defense counsel may attempt to exclude prejudicial
material by means of judicial admission.
There is virtually no limit to the number of
situations which may impel defense counsel to
seek to prevent the introduction of evidence in
such a manner. In most cases, however, they will
more or less correspond with the categories listed
below.

is that they illustrate the nature and extent of the
wounds, prove the corpus delicti and, where the
exhibits are photographs, establish the identity
of the victim. Where the judge has admitted the
exhibits despite a stipulation, a large number of
appellate courts have nevertheless affirmed the
conviction, on a number of grounds which, it is
submitted, are clearly unreasonable. Some examples follow, and the list could be multiplied
many times over.
In State v. Edwards,8 the prosecutor was allowed to introduce a photograph of the head and
torso of the female murder victim, showing the
wound infected with maggots and the body in an
advanced state of decomposition. The South
Carolina Supreme Court, in finding no error,
stated that the photograph could not possibly
have prejudiced the defendant, for everything it
depicted was later testified to in detail by other
witnesses. It agreed that gruesome exhibits calcuGRuEsomE ExmBITS
lated to inflame should be excluded if irrelevant or
If a valid judgment may be based upon the not substantially necessary to prove a material
number of reported decisions, it appears that fact, but stated that the photograph here in
judicial admissions are resorted to most often question proved the identity of the deceased. Two
where the prosecutor, in homicide cases, seeks to judges dissented on the grounds that the exhibit
introduce photographs of the victim taken after was dearly inflammatory and unnecessary as well,
commission of the crime, or the victim's blood- for there had never been any real issue of identity
stained clothing. The usual reasons advanced by in the case.
the prosecutor for the admission of the exhibits
Although no judicial admission was involved,
5It is as rare as it is unreasonable for a court to say the decision is significant because the reasoning
that the judge is unjustified in excluding proof of a would apply even had one been made. In denying
fact already admitted, as was said in State v. Camp- the existence of prejudice merely because other
bell, 93 Conn. 3, 104 Atl. 653 (1918).
9 WIGMORE, EvIDENc E §2591 (3d ed. 1940) reads in witnesses testified to everything depicted in the
part:
photograph (including the identity of the de"A fact that is judicially admitted needs no evidence
ceased), the majority seems to have missed the
from the party benefiting by the admission.
"But his evidence, if he chooses to offer it, may even point completely; even if identity had been in
be excluded; first, because it is now as immaterial to issue, the aliundance of other evidence which
the issues as though the pleadings had marked it out
of the controversy ... ; next, because it may be super- proved all that the photograph could have proved
fluous and merely cumber the trial... ; and further- made the introduction of the gruesome photomore, because the added dramatic force which might graph unnecessary and thus prejudicial. Under
sometimes be gained from the examination of a witness
no circumstances could the submission of the
to the fact (a force, indeed, which the admission is
often designed especially to obviate) is not a thing photograph to the jury be considered necessary
which the party can be said to be always entitled to.
to prove identity, and its introduction could not
"Nevertheless, a colorless admission by the opponent may sometimes have the effect of depriving the have helped but inflame the jury.
party of the legitimate moral force of his evidence;
A violent murder is always capable of causing
furthermore, a judicial admission may be cleverly
made with grudging limitations or evasions or insinua- revulsion on the part of a jury, but the danger of
tions (especially in criminal cases), so as to be techni- prejudice is perhaps greatest when the violence
cally a waiver of proof. Hence, there should be no is directed against the young and the helpless.
absolute rule on the subject; and the trial Court's
State v. Leland,9 a case in which the death penalty
discretion should determine whether a particular
admission is so plenary as to render the first party's
evidence wholly needless under the circumstances."
7 See 22A C.J.S. CriminalLow §640 (1961), and cases
cited therein.

8 194 S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587 (1940).
9 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951), aff'd on other
grounds, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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was imposed, involved the killing of a fifteen year
old girl. Defendant had confessed the crime to
the police, but had pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity. Despite the defendant's judicial admissions, made in open court during the trial, as
to the nature of the wounds, the prosecutor was
allowed to introduce the victim's blood-stained
clothes, showing the tears made by the knife, as
well as photographs of the victim's nude body,
showing the wounds themselves. The conviction
was affirmed by the Oregon Supreme Court, which
stated that as long as the defendant's plea of not
guilty stood,10 the state had, the right to prove its
case "up to the hilt," and to choose its own way
of .doing so. "There is no rule," the court added,
"which requires the district attorney to be mealymouthed. . ...
,,n The clothes and pictures were
relevant, said the court, because they tended to
show that the wounds were inflicted in the manner
described in defendant's confession and because
they tended to show premeditation and deliberation.
The facts of the Lelatd case illustrate a point
too often neglected. The introduction of gruesome
exhibits is dangerous enough when the defendant
denies any connection with the crime; but where,
as here, defendant admits the acts which resulted
in death and relies on another defense, the exhibits
may so inflame the jury as to blind them to the
merits of that defense. The history of the criminal
law is not barren of cases in which an insane
defendant has been found sane not so much on the
basis of the psychiatric testimony as upon the
jury's revulsion at the hideous nature of his acts.
Where the acts are admitted by defendant, only
the clearest necessity should impel the court to
allow proof so prone to misuse by the jury.
State v. Stansberry involved a prosecution for
assault with intenit to murder. Defendant pleaded
self-defense. Despite defendant's judicial admission
that it was he who inflicted the wounds, the
prosecutor was allowed to introduce the victim's
clothing which was "grewsomely stained with
blood." A doctor had already testified as to the
nature of the wounds. The Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, stating that the admission
or exclusion of such evidence is -a matter for the
10 In Oregon, a plea of guilty to murder will be
accepted. ORE. REv. STAT. ch. 163, §130 (1955). In
other states, however, this- may not be the case. See,
e.g., N.Y. CODE Cmu. PRoC. §332.
11190 Ore. at 630, 227 P.2d at 799.
12 182 Iowa 908, 166 N.W. 359 (1918).

discretion of the trial judge, and no admission by
defendant should be able to prevent the introduction of evidence by the prosecutor. A contrary
rule, said the court, would work harm in the
following way: if a prosecution witness made the
case for the state less strong than the facts justified
and less strong than it could be made by other
available evidence, then the defendant could end
further inquiry on the point by stipulating that
the witness had said all there was to say. It takes
no lengthy analysis of this argument to realize
that the court had an erroneous conception of the
nature of a judicial admission. An admission has
no validity unless it admits all the relevant facts
which the evidence sought to be excluded tends to
prove. Whatever relevant fact is not admitted
may be proved, unless inadmissible on other
grounds.
State v. Upton is involved a conviction for murder
and an imposition of the death penalty. The
defense was insanity. The prosecutor was allowed
to introduce photographs showing the wounds on
the victim's body despite defendant's stipulation
as to the ndature and location of the wounds. The
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, stating that
the photographs were not gruesome and were
admissible for the purpose of clarifying and
illustrating the testimony, proving the corpus
delicti, and corroborating the identity of the
deceased. It should be noted, however, that there
appeared to be not the slightest question about the
corpus delicti or the victim's identity. And it is
doubtful whether the illustrative value of the
photographs was so great as to offset the possibility
of their misuse against a defendant who had
admitted the killing but had claimed insanity as a.
defense.
In Rivers v. United States,.4 a prosecution for
murder in which defendant had admitted dismembering the body of the victim but had denied
commission of the murder, the prosecutor was
permitted to introduce pictures of the dismembered
body in the morgue. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the trial judge was
held not to have abused his discretion in admitting
the evidence. The pictures were relevant, said the
court, because they showed the mode and
thoroughness of the cutting (factors which the
defendant had not admitted), and this would bear
13 60

N.M. 205, 290 P.2d 440 (1955).
4270 F.2d 435 (9th 'Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 920 (1960).
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upon whether the dismemberment had been done
"wildly, or in a calculated manner." Although
reasonable in theory, the decision may rest on an
overly-optimistic appraisal of the jury's ability
to make such a fine distinction when confronted
with such a gruesome exhibit.
Occasionally, gruesome exhibits are introduced
despite appropriate judicial admissions by the
defendant, and the resulting convictions are
affirmed on the ground that defendant has no
right to prevent, by a mere judicial admission,
the introduction of relevant evidence by the
prosecutor.15 Such an attitude, it is submitted, is
dearly unreasonable and allows a defendant to be
seriously and unnecessarily prejudiced because of a
misguided deference to what are considered the
merits of the adversary system.
In other cases, however, a contrary rule has
been applied, and a judicial admission has been
held sufficient to prevent introduction of gruesome
exhibits. In State v. Long,8 the prosecutor was
allowed to introduce the bloody clothes of a murder
victim despite defendant's judicial admission that
the crime (with which he denied confiection) was
committed by shooting and stabbing. On appeal,
the conviction for second degree murder was
reversed. The court stated that the defendant had
admitted all valid facts to be drawn from the
evidence. An examination of the clothes would
not aid the jury, connect defendant with the
crime, prove the identity of the deceased, or show
the nature of the wound. Under the circumstances,
the creation of prejudice would be the only effect
of the submission of the clothes to the jury.
The court's view in the Long case is shared by
other courts. Indeed, some decisions have gone
even further. In Lacoume v. State,17 it was held
error to admit, in a prosecution for aggravated
assault, the bloody clothes of the victim, where
the defendant did not dispute the nature and
position of the wounds. This decision goes further
than that in the Long case, for the defendant
made no formal admission and the jury was thus
free to reject what other evidence the prosecutor
may have introduced concerning the wounds.18
15See State v. Powell, 21 Del. 24, 61 Atl. 966 (Ct. of
Oyer & Terminer 1904); State v. Griffin, 218 Iowa 1301,
254 N.W. 841 (1934).
1"336 Mo. 630, 80 S.W.2d 154 (1935).
17 65 Tex. Cr. 146, 143 S.W. 626 (1912).
"8See also State v. Porter, 276 Mo. 387, 207 S.W.
774 (1918) (introduction of bloody clothes error where
they proved nothing not already known); Oxendine v.
State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Cr. 1958) (exhibition on

And in People v. Burns," an exceedingly gruesome
picture of a murder victim, taken after autopsy,
was held improperly admitted at the trial. Here
the court acknowledged that there was a genuine
dispute as to the cause of the wounds shown, but
stated that the dispute could not have been
resolved by an examination of the photographs.
In considering whether to make a judicial
admission, therefore, defense counsel should
realize that gruesome exhibits are sui generis,
largely because of their inflammatory nature.
Ordinarily, counsel should admit the truth of all
matters which the exhibits may tend to prove.
Cases may arise, however, where the exhibits are
so gruesome and their probative value so slight
that an appeal court would prohibit their use
even in the absence of an admission. The difficulty
inherent in predicting such a prohibition, and the
harm done if the prediction is incorrect, should
cause most counsel to make the admission.
PROOF OF OTHER CPIEs

With respect to the proof of other crimes, the
general rule in the United States, as stated by
McCormick, is:
"The prosecution may not introduce evidence
of other criminal acts of the accused unless the
evidence is substantially relevant for some
other purpose than to show a probability that
he committed the crime on trial because he is a
man of criminal character. There are numerous
other purposes for which evidence of other
criminal acts may be offered, and when so
offered the rule of exclusion is simply
20
inapplicable."
Where the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence
of defendant's other crimes for a purpose other
than to show a propensity to commit crime, defense
counsel may often prevent him from doing so by
means of a judicial admission. Whether defense
counsel may do so is determined by the theory of
admissibility upon which the prosecutor relies,
and by the nature of the defense.
One of the exceptions to the general rule of
exclusion exists where proof of similar crimes is
large screen of colored slides showing nude body of
victim in morgue, autopsy incisions clearly visible,
error where no issue existed as to cause of death or
details of wounds); Chapman v. State, 66 Tex. Cr.
489, 147 S.W. 580 (1912) (exhibition of actual wounds
of assault victim error where they proved nothing not
already known).
19109 Cal. App. 2d 524, 241 P.2d 308 (1952).
20 McCoxuscK, EVIDENCE §157, at 327 (1954). See
also 1 WIG ORE, EVMENCE §215 (3d ed. 1940).
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introduced "to show... that the act on trial
was not inadvertent, accidental, unintentional or
without guilty knowledge." 21 The issue, however,
must not be a specious one. There must actually
be a doubt as to the circumstances of the act said
to constitute the crime. In People v. Molineaux
the New York Court of Appeals stated:
"It would be a travesty upon our jurisprudence to hold that, in a case of such appalling
and transparent criminality, it could. ever be
deemed necessary or proper to resort to proof
of extraneous crimes to anticipate the impossible
defense of accident or mistake."12
However, where there may be a substantial doubt
as to the intent of the defendant in committing the
act charged, such evidence is admissible for the
purpose mentioned.
Where the prosecutor proposes to introduce such
evidence to prove the required intent, the
defendant may, under the authority of certain
cases to be discussed, resort to a judicial admission,
stipulating that if the act was done, it was done
with the requisite criminal intent (or guilty
knowledge). Once this admission has been made,
proof of the similar acts is unnecessary and therefore prejudicial. And, of course, the only remaining
logical connection between similar acts and commission of the act charged is the tendency of the
former to show a propensity to crime-a forbidden
inference unless the defendant first introduces
evidenc6 of his good character. Thus, an admission
that if the act was done it was done with the
necessary mens rea should, logically and fairly,
prevent all proof of the similar acts.
Where such an admission is made, however, in
most states the defendant should not become a
witness in his own behalf. For if the defendant
becomes a witness, his previous crimes will, in
most states, become admissible as bearing upon
his credibility. Thus, he will have kept them out
when they were to be used for one purpose, only
to see them introduced for another, and the jury
may misuse the evidence in precisely the same
way. However, in those states which allow only
certain crimes to be used for impeachment purpo ses,2 defendant may often be able to stipulate
and testify as well.
§157, at 329 (1954)
tviDNcE
21McCoic],
168 N.Y. 264, 305, 61 N.E. 286, 298-99 (1901).
See also State v. Giligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 At. 649
(1918).
23 See 3 WIGOORE, EviDENCE §980 (3d ed. 1940);
McCoRucK, EvmIENCE §43 (1954).

An example of an admission of this type is found
in State v. Vance, 4 which involved a conviction
for indecent exposure. At the trial, the prosecutor
attempted to prove previous indecent exposures in
order to negative accident and prove intent.
Defendant objected, and admitted in open court
that if the act was done, it was designedly done.
The evidence was admitted. On appeal, introduction of the evidence was held reversible error,
even though the court had instructed the jury as
to its proper use. There was no issue of mistake,
said the court, and even if mistake or intent had
been an issue, defendant's admissionhad removed it
from the case.
In State v. Strum,25 a similar decision was
rendered. There, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that, in a prosecution for knowingly receiving
stolen goods, defendant's admission that whatever
he did was done designedly and with knowledge
was sufficient to require exclusion of the prosecutor's evidence that defendant had received
other stolen goods not related to the transaction
for which he was on trial.
Unfortunately, the Vance and Strum cases were
discredited by State v. Kappen.2 There, in a prosecution for the possession of barglar's tools, the
prosecutor refrained from showing prior crimes,
relying on the defendant's stipulation that if he
had actually possessed the tools, he had done so
with a burglarious intent, and not by accident.
The judge, relying on the rule of the Vance and
Strum cases, had accepted the admission and
prevented the proof of previous burglaries. On
appeal, the defendant reversed his position and
claimed that the evidence was insufficient to
convict, because there was no proof of intent.
The court quite correctly held thaf defendant was
bound by his admission, for it was the admission
alone which caused the prosecutor to withhold
his proof. The defendant was precluded from
stating that his admission was less effective than
would have been the proof which the admission
obviated.
Had the court stopped here, no one could find
fault with its decision. But it continued, and
specifically disapproved the rule of the Strum
case in these words:
"No admission should be deemed to control
the sound discretion of the court to permit
2

119 Iowa 685, 94 N.W. 204 (1903).

25 184 Iowa 1165, 169 N.W. 373 (1918).
26191 Iowa 19, 180 N.W. 307 (1920).
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evidence otherwise admissible. Much less should
27
a hypothetical admission have such effect."
There was a strong dissent by Salinger, J., which
deserves extensive quotation not only because of
its logic, but also because it makes a well-merited
but seldom heard criticism of prosecutors who
misuse such dangerous evidence. Judge Salinger
stated:
"It was confessed in the Strum case that such
evidence is admissible for nothing except to
show guilty knowledge. And it was thereupon
held that there could be no legitimate reason
for forcing such evidence upon the consideration
of an untrained jury, when its only proper
purpose was to prove what was confessed. It is
now said that there should be a discretion as
to whether such testimony... should be received. Why? For whom, and for what, should
such discretion be permitted? For use by just
one kind of lawyer. The sort of lawyer that would
put [such testimony] in evidence.., on the
pretense that it was done to prove intent,
although he knew intent was confessed, the
purpose being in fact the hope that the jury
would treat this evidence, not as mere evidence
of intent, but as tending to prove that the
particular.. . [crime] charged in the indictment
had

been... [committed].

Decisions

of this

court which leave to the state every legitimate
right it has should not be overruled to give
pettifoggers a chance to which they are not
entitled-a chance to take away liberty wrong28
fully because juries reason as juries do."
The logic of these words is unassailable and would
apply to almost all instances where a judicial
admission is proper.2
In Commonwealth v. Miller,30 defendant had
been convicted of passing three forged notes. At
the trial, the prosecutor, for the purpose of proving
guilty knowledge and the forgery itself, sought to
introduce 30 other notes passed by defendant at
about the time the three notes were passed, and
also alleged to be forgeries. The defendant stipulated that he passed the three notes mentioned in
the indictment, and that if they were forgeries, he
knew them to be so. The trial judge stated that
considering the peculiar characteristics of the
27

Id. at 29, 180 N.W. at 312.
Id. at 34-35, 180 N.W. at 314.
2 Nevertheless, Iowa courts still follow the rule of
the Kappen case. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 243 Iowa
65, 50 N.W.2d 601 (1951).
3057 Mass. (3 Cush.) 243 (1849).
28
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alleged forgery, it would aid the jury to see other
notes passed by him at about the same time, and
alleged to have been forged in the same manner,
and thus the evidence was admissible for this
purpose despite the defendant's admission. The
purpose of showing guilty knowledge was not
discussed by the judge, but it is clear that if such
was the sole purpose the evidence should have
been excluded.
Assuming a strong similarity between the
methods used in forging the two sets of notes, the
judge ruled quite correctly, for as McCormick has
stated, it is permissible for the prosecutor "to
prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly
identical in method as to earmark them as the
handiwork of the accused." 31 No admission could
have been made by defendant except one conceding
the very fact he wished to exclude. On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
affirmed on the ground that the checks were
admissible to prove guilty knowledge despite
defendant's admission, upon which, said the court,
the prosecutor was not required to rely.
People v.Sindicai is quite similar to the Miller
case. There, in a prosecution for forgery, defendant
offered to stipulate that if he had signed his name
to the check in question, he did so with an intent
to defraud. The prosecutor was nevertheless
allowed to show other fraudulent checks issued at
about the same time and endorsed by defendant.
On appeal, the California District Court of Appeal
held the evidence admissible either to prove intent
or to show the existence of a common scheme or
plan.n The California Supreme Court, in a per
curiam decision, denied a hearing, stating that the
evidence was proper to show a common scheme,
but that it would express no opinion as to the
admissibility of the evidence for the purpose of
proving intent. Although the admission should
have removed the issue of intent from the case,
it was quite correct to hold that the -admission
could not exclude evidence aimed at proving a
common scheme.
In State v.Morgan,3 a similar issue was presented
and, it is submitted, erroneously decided.
Defendant was convicted of incest committed with
a'McComcK, EvmENcE §157, at 328 (1954).
32 54 Cal. App. 193, 201 Pac. 975 (1921).
McCopm c, EvmENcE §157, at 328 (1954), states
that proof of prior crimes is permissible where the
purpose is "to prove the- existence of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the
present crime on trial is a part."
42 S.D. 517, 176 N.W. 35 (1920).
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his niece in S6uth Dakota, where the trial took
place. During the course of the trial, the prosecutor
wished to prove that immediately prior to the
commission of the crime in South Dakota, defendant had committed incest with that same niece in
Colorado. The purpose of the evidence of the prior
crime was "to show a passion or propensity for
illicit sexual relations with the particular person
concerned in the crime on trial."'35 Defendant
formally admitted that at the previous -time and
place mentioned by the prosecutor he was cohabiting with his niece, knowing of her relationship to him. Despite this admission, the prosecutor
was allowed to prove the very same fact by means
of letters written by defendant to his niece's
parents. The letters were highly prejudicial to the
defendant because in them he not only admitted
cohabiting with his niece in Colorado but also
dared the parents to do something about it. On
appeal, admission of the letters was held proper.
The court stated that the reasoning of the Strum
case did not apply, for there the proffered evidence
related only to the question of intent, while in
the instant case the evidence went to the issue
of whether the crime had in fact been committed.
This, of course, makes no sense at all, for the
defendant's formal admission also went to that
same issue, by conceding a fact tending to prove
the commission of the crime, and indeed the same
fact which the letters tended to prove. The only
possibld justification for admitting the letters was
that the defendant's defiance made it more likely
that he would persist in his conduct (i.e., until
he reached South Dakota) than if the letters had
been of a merely informative nature. This, however, was not mentioned by the court. And, considering the admission, it is quite doubtful whether
the value of admitting the letters even for that
purpose would have been so great as to justify the
placing of such prejudicial matter before the jury.
However, in People v. Washburn,36 evidence of a
prior offense offered- for the purpose of proving
guilty knowledge was held improperly received
where the defendant had made an admission
indicating that he would rely not upon a claim of
a lack of the requisite knowledge, but only upon a
denial of the act charged.
Under another theory, evidence of other crimes
is admissible to show that defendant had a motive
3
5McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE §157, at 328-29
36 104 Cal. App. 662, 286 Pac. 711 (1930).

(1954).

to commit the crime charged.37 The efficacy of a
judicial admission to preclude proof for such a
purpose is doubtful, for it may be quite important
for a jury to be able to estimate the strength of the
motive. In People v. - Scheck,38 for example, the
accused in a murder prosecution offered to stipulate that at the time he was alleged to have killed
a policeman, he was "under indictment," and
therefore possessed a motive to kill. Despite this
offer to stipulate, the prosecutor was allowed to
prove that at the time of the crime, the accused was
urider indictment for murder and robbery. The
admission of this proof was upheld on appeal, the
court emphasizing that the nature of the indictment was important, for the strength of the motive
to kill in order to avoid arrest depended largely
upon the seriousness of the crime for which the
arrest was to be made. One is not likely to kill
in order to avoid arrest for a petty offense. The
court's logic seems unassailable on this issue,
although the facts of the case so overwhelmingly
proved the defendant's guilt that the trial judge
might reasonably have excluded the proof of
motive as unnecessary.
Similarly, in McHenry v. United States, it was
held proper to reject an accused's admission that
at the time he was alleged to have murdered a
policeman in order to avoid arrest, he was
suspected of a felony and that therefore the policeman had a right of arrest. Further, it was held
proper to allow the prosecutor to show that the
felony referred to was murder, and that defendant
had actually committed it.
However, even in the absence of an admission,
it has been held reversible error to allow proof of
prior crimes to establish a motive already fully
established by other proof.40 This seems a fair
decision, but except in such a case, where motive
has already been established, it appears that prior
crimes will remain admissible where they tend to
show a motive. The nature of the concept of
motive precludes recourse, in most cases, to a
judicial admission.
Evidence of other crimes may also be introduced
where they tend to prove consciousness of guilt.4'
Thus it is permissible to show that after the crime
charged was committed, defendant committed
McCopmcx, EVIDENCE §157, at 330 (1954).
356 Ill. 56, 190 N.E. 108 (1934).
- 276 Fed. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
40 People v. Mangano, 375 Ill. 72, 30 N.E.2d 428
(940).
41McCopMcx, EVIDENCE §157, at 330 (1954).
3
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certain other crimes while fleeing or that he
murdered the only eye-witness to the crime
charged. 3 A judicial admission is useless where the
damaging evidence tends to prove consciousness
of guilt, for the defendant must either admit the
commission of other crimes or his consciousness of
guilt, thus keeping nothing prejudicial away from
the jury." The only possible exception would
occur in the rare case where defendant claims he
was in error in thinking he had committed the
crime. Under such circumstances he should stipulate to consciousness of guilt and seek to prevent
the then unnecessary proof thereof.
Another accepted reason for introducing evidence of other crimes is to prove the identity of the
accused. 45 This may b6 done in a number of ways,
but two should serve as examples for our purpose
here. First, the prosecutor may wish to show that
the crime charged was committed in an unusual
and distinctive manner identical with the method4
defendant used in committing other crimes. 6
Here, it would seem that no judicial admission
could possibly preclude the proof. An admission
that the method used in the crime charged is the
one that defendant would have used had he committed the crime simply does not admit all that
the prosecutor may licitly prove, and any stronger
admission would have to include acknowledgment of the other crimes.
A second method of proving identity is by the
introduction of evidence connecting defendant
with a weapon used during the clime charged.
Most often, the state will merely prove purchase
of the weapon by defendant, and no judicial
admission is available. However, the state will
occasionally attempt a method of proof involving
other crimes, and defendant then should be able to
resort successfully to a stipulation. For example,
in Slate v. Creighlton,47 the prosecutor sought to
prove defendant's possession of the murder weapon
42People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. 108, 121 N.E. 246
(1918).
43People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 14i N.E. 196
(1923).
44 See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948), where
evidence of defendant's flight was held properly received, even though he admitted flight. It is difficult
to understand what defendant hoped to gain by the
admission, or what prejudice could have been created
by the mere proof of what he had conceded. For a
similar case, see People v. Fredericks, 106 Cal. 554,
39 Pac. 944 (1895).
46 McCoRmcx, EvmENcE §157, at 330 (1954).
11Id. at 328.
47330 Mo. 1176, 52 S.W.2d 556 (1932).

by the testimony of a policeman who stated that
the weapon was his own, but that when he had
attempted previously to arrest the defendant for
a bank robbery, the defendant had taken the gun
from him. Although the defendant stated he would
not deny that he had committed the crime charged
with that particular weapon (if indeed he had
committed the crime), the judge agreed with the
prosecutor's contention that the state had a right
to prove every element of the crime as it saw fit,
and allowed the introduction of the testimony.
The decision was reversed on appeal, the court
stating that the proof would have been proper had
defendant's possession of the weapon been in
issue, but was improper in the face of the admission. It should be noted that the admission need
not have gone so far. A mere stipulation by defendant that he had come into possession of the weapon
on a particular date (mentioning the date when
it was taken from the policeman) would have
sufficed to prevent the testimony, according to the
reasoning of the court:
Occasionally, a prosecutor will attempt to
convey to the jury the fact that defendant has
committed other crimes without actually introducing proof of the crimes themselves under any
exception to the general rule of exclusion. For
example, in the murder trial popularly known as
the "Reader's Digest Murder Case," the district
attorney wished to show that the crime was the
result of a plan of long standing. Under the theory
that it was relevant to show the time and place of
the inception of the plan, the judge allowed proof
that one defendant commenced his plot while in
jail--obviously for some other offense. 48 No judicial admission was made, but if defendant had stipulated that the plot was of long-standing (even
giving the date of its inception), could it be reasonably held that mention of the place where the
plot began was not improper?
In another case," where the defendant's identity
was in issue, the prosecutor introduced a witness
who claimed he knew defendant. (The witness was
an official of a prison in which defendant had
previously served a sentence for another crime.)
Although sustaining an objection to a question
calling for defendant's status at the time the
witness knew him, the witness was allowed, over
objection, to relate that his oun status had been
4QOURSLE,

T E

READER'S DIGEST MURDER CASE

242 (1952).
49State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867).
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that of a prison official. No doubt the jury caught
the point, despite the necessity of drawing an
all-too-obvious inference. The ruling was upheld.
No-admission was made that the witness actually
knew the defendant, but it is submitted that had
it been done, it would have been highly improper
for the court to allow the witness to mention what
his status had been when he became acquainted
with defendant.
Moreover, suppose that during the course of a
trial it becomes important to determine whether
the accused knew how to operate a particular type
of machine. If the defendant stipulates as to his
ability, can it fairly be said that the prosecutor
may properly reject the admission and prove that
defendant actually operated such a machine at a
prison workshop? The language used in some of the
cases already cited would give the prosecutor
the right to do just that, although such a course of
action involves unfairness of the grossest sort.
Stipulations have often been attempted in
prosecutions under the various Habitual Offender
Acts, many of which either allow or require the
inclusion of prior convictions in the indictment
and their proof upon trial. The procedure most
often followed by defense counsel is to offer to
admit the prior crimes out of the presence of the
jury, and to ask the judge to inflict the heavier
penalty if the verdict is guilty or, if the jury fixes
the penalty, to charge the jury only as to the
heavier penalty. The judges' invariable refusal to
accept the admission has been invariably upheld
by the courts. 5 Proof of prior crimes for this
purpose, however, has recently come under attack
as violative of due process. In United States v.
Price,51 the constitutionality of the procedure was
upheld by a divided court, although Circuit
Judge Hastie, in a concurring opinion, stated:
"I am unable to avoid the conclusion that a
procedure so likely to prejudice the accused
and at the same time so easy to avoid without
50See, e.g., Berry v. State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E.
635 (1935). It is encouraging to note, however, that in
1959 the New York State District Attorneys' Association introduced and sponsored a bill "which would
prohibit the district attorney from alluding to the
previous conviction if the defendant would admit the
same on the court record outside of- the hearing of the
jury." Silver, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem:
A Prosecutor's View, 44 MirN. L. Rxv. 835, 851, 852
n.59 (1960). This solution to the problem is now included in N. Y. CODE CRas. PRoc. §275-b.
51258 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
922 (1958).

the sacrifice of any interest of the state is fundamentally unfair." 2
In stating that the prejudicial procedure was
"easy to avoid," Judge Hastie was referring to the
method used in some states of having a "separate
trial" on the question of punishment after the
finding of a verdict of guilty." Such a procedure
clearly removes all due process objections. In
the absence of statutory authority for such a
procedure, however, fairness can be assured by
reliance upon a judicial admission such as the
type already mentioned.
QuAnrmcAIoNs op EXPERT WrnmxssEs

Where a witness for the prosecution is an expert
of eminent qualifications, the defendant may seek
to prevent the experience and ability of the expert
from becoming known to the jury by stipulating
that the witness is qualified to give his opinion.
If such an admission were allowed to prevent
proof of qualification, a great disservice would
be done to the jury, who would then often be
without proper means to judge between conflicting
opinions on a subject of which they may be completely ignorant. Moreover, it would sometimes
prevent a jury which must determine a question
of sanity from learning that one expert is a qualified psychiatrist, while the other is a doctor with no
psychiatric experience. Such results are dearly to
be avoided.
In dealing wiLh this issue, an Assistant United
States Attorney has stated:
"The qualifications of the prosecution psychiatrist should never be stipulated. Juries are
extremely interested in the qualifications of
expert witnesses. The prosecution psychiatrist
should testify as to his educational background
and experience in great detail."04
Here, the jury's interest must be satisfied. There
is already too much seriously wrong with our
system of expert evidence to allow a procedure
depriving the jury of information necessary for a
proper evaluation of the expert's opinion.
On occasion, however, these considerations have
been ignored. In State v. Douglas,5 5 a prosecution
258 F.2d at 923.

5 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Supp.

1959).
0
Flannery, Meeting the Insanity Defense, 51 J.
Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 309, 314 (1960). See also Bowler,
Oral Argument in CriminalProsecution,52 J. Cm. L.,
C. & P.S. 203, 207 (1961).
5578 R.I. 60, 78 A.2d 850 (1951).
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for cruelty to animals, the defendant called a
veterinarian to the stand. The prosecutor admitted
that the witness was a qualified expert, and then
objected when counsel sought to elicit the qualifications of the witness. The judge sustained the
objection and prevented proof of qualifications,
even though the prosecution experts had not
been veterinarians, but merely people with long
practical experience in the handling of animals.
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed. The court
stated that the purpose of evidence concerning
qualifications is to enable the judge to pass upon
the competency of the expert. If competency is
admitted, nothing further is gained by additional
questions. This reasoning, dearly erroneous, has
rarely been followed elsewhere.
PREVENTION OF UNDUE SYMPATHY

No jury can truly immunize itself from feelings
of sympathy for the relatives of tile victim of a
homicide. Yet, if the accused is to receive a fair
trial, these feelings should be kept out of the
trial as completely as possible. Occasionally,
however, a prosecutor will seek to play upon such
emotions by placing the victim's kin on the stand
unnecessarily, or by indirectly placing the grief of
the relatives before the jury by the introduction
of other evidence. Because of the great danger of
prejudice, one would suspect that the policy of the
courts would be to discourage such conduct. Often,
however, the courts have done exactly the opposite.
In State v. Seyboldt,6 the court allowed the
prosecutor to place the victim's widow on the
stand for the sole purpose of identifying the
victim's watch, which had been stolen, despite the
fact that defendant had admitted the identity
of the watch. On appeal, the ruling was upheld. 57
In People v. MacPherson,"' the court upheld a
judge's ruling which permitted the prosecutor to
place the victim's widow upon, the stand, mainly
for the purpose of proving that her husband was
alive prior to the automobile collision which was
the foundation of the crime charged, despite
defendant's stipulation of that fact. The court
stated that no admission can preclude the
prosecutor from offering competent evidence. In
5665 Utah 204, 236 Pac. 225 (1925).
57 See also State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac.
286 (1912), where no error was found in permitting a
prosecutor to place upon the stand the victim's mother,
whose testimony was so irrelevant that, upon completion, it was stricken from the record.
"323 Mich. 438, 35 N.W.2d 376 (1949).
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cases similar to these, courts would earn greater
respect by seeing through the rather transparent
conduct of the prosecutor, and by allowing the
admission to prevent him from pursuing a course
of action which his own sense of propriety should
have forbidden.
In People v. Parisi," the prosecutor was allowed
to introduce the dying declaration of the homicide
victim, despite the defendant's admission that
he had committed the crime. Normally, the introducti'on of a dying declaration will not prejudice
one who has admitted the crime, because of the
rule that "the declarations are admissible only
insofar as they relate to the circumstances of the
killing and to the events more or less nearly preced'
ing it in time and leading up to it."
0 Here, however, the declaration as introduced referred to the
victim's "poor little children" and other matters
calculated to arouse the sympathies of the jury.
On appeal, the court relied on the argument that
no admission can limit the prosecutor in determining how to prove his case, and affirmed the
imposition of the death penalty.
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S REPUTATION

It has been stated as "generally agreed that
the accused in all criminal cases may produce
evidence of his good character as substantive
evidence of his innocence."' 6" In order to prevent a
parade of witnesses as to defendant's good reputation for a particular quality (e.g., peacefulness,
in murder prosecutions), prosecutors have occasionally admitted that the defendant's reputation was
good, and have thereby succeeded in precluding
the testimony of the character witnesses. Such a
62
procedure has been upheld by some courts.
In theory, none of defendant's rights is denied
by such a preclusion, for the prosecutor has
admitted all that the testimony would tend to
prove. Again in theory, the identity of the character witness is irrelevant, as his purpose is merely
to convey the opinion of the community, and not
his own.61 In practice, however, the identity of
the witness may play an important role, and it is
far more advantageous to the defendant to have,
"190 Cal. 542, 213 Pac. 968 (1923).
60 McCosrxcx, EVIDENCE §260, at 558 (1954). See
also 5 WIGiORE, EVIDENCE §1344 (3d ed. 1940).
61McCoRMcK. EVIDENCE §158, at 333 (1054).
12 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. 46, 290
S.W. 163 (1927); Bowlin v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 452,
248 S.W. 396 (1923).
6See McCoRmcK, EVIDENCE §158, at 334 (1954).
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as character witnesses, prominent and respected
persons, rather than unknowns. Perhaps it is this
realistic consideration which has caused some trial
judges, in precluding character witnesses after
an admission by the prosecutor, to mention to the
jury the names of the witnesses whose character
evidence is being excluded," and which has persuaded some appellate courts to prevent such an
exclusion altogether."5
METHOD OF MAKING JTuDIcIAL ADMSSIONS

When defense counsel wishes to exclude proof,
under proper circumstances, by means of a judicial
admission, he must follow certain procedures,
lest the admission be held to have no effect. First,
the admission should be made formally in open
court during the course of the trial, and its purpose
(the exclusion of proof) should be stated. As a
practical matter this is almost always done, if only
in making an objection to the introduction by the
prosecutor of the evidence which the admission
was intended to exclude.
Of crucial importance is the reauirement that
defendant admit the fad itsel, and not merely that
the witness would testify to the fact, for exclusion
of the proof would deprive the jury of the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness
by his appearance and demeanor. If an admission
could merely keep a witness from the stand, the
jury would have no way of determining whether
to believe what they are informed he would have
said. Thus, to give effect to a mere admission as to
what a witness would say would unconscionably
deprive the proponent of the witness of his right
to present and prove his case. It is certain that
such an "admission" has no effect,"6 although
occasionally there is some confused thinking on the
point." The admission must be at least as broad
as the relevant proof would have been,1 and it
"See Bowlin v. State, supra note 62. But a later
case in the same state has upheld a trial judge's refusal
to give the names to the jury. Griffith v. State, 145 Tex.
Cr. 465, 169 S.W.2d 173 (1943).
65 People v. Helms, '243 App. Div. 818, 278 N.Y.
Supp. 366 (2d Dept. 1935) (per curiam).
"6See State v. Boyer, 342 Mo. 64, 112 S.W.2d 575
(1937).
67See, e.g., People v. Newman, 102 Cal. App. 2d
302, 227 P.2d 470 (1951). In that case, involving a
robbery prosecution, defendant wyas said to have
waived proof that a lethal weapon was used in the
robbery by his counsel's statement that certain witnesses would testify that they had been robbed by
persons armed with deadly weapons.
"See McHenry v. United States, 276 Fed. 761
(D.C. Cir. 1921); State v. Griffen, 218 Iowa 1301, 254
N.W. 841 (1934).

will be held ineffective if made only after the fact
sought to be excluded has been proved. 6 A mere
failure to object is obviously not a formal judicial
admission.7 0 But it appears that a statement of a
witness may effect an admission by the witness's
proponent.7'
CONCLUSIONS

In deciding upon the issue under consideration,
courts have demonstrated a wide divergence of
viewpoints. Some have simply denied that an
admission may ever exclude proof in a criminal
case.7 ' Occasionally, the adversary system is used
as a justification, as where one court stated that
an offer to admit can be rejected by the prosecutor,
who need not "accept the judgment of a stranger
to the office." 7 3 And a defendant's request that
certain prejudicial matters be excluded by his
admission is occasionally denied on tfe grounds
that he has a right to force the state to prove every
element of the crime with which he is charged; 74
the accused is then in the strange position of
having a right to insist on being unnecessarily
prejudiced. The automatic denial of the right to
preclude the introduction of evidence by means of
stipulation is the result of a judicial formalism
attuned to times and places other than our own.
A court which rigidly adheres to such an attitude
"People v. Palumbo, 127 Cal. App. 703, 16 P.2d
316 (1932); State v. Farley, 48 Wash. 2d 11, 290 P.2d
987 (1955), cerl. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
70Housman v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 49, 230 S.W.2d
5417 (1950).
' For an example of this sort of admission in a civil
case, see Hopper v. Comfort Coal-Lumber Co., 276
App. Div. 1014, 95 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dept. 1950).
There, in an action for negligence, defendant introduced a witness who admitted that he was a paid
investigator .acting in the interest and on behalf of
defendant. On cross-examination, plaintiff was allowed,
over objection, to elicit the further fact that the witness
was an investigator for an insurance company. Ordinarily, such evidence would be admissible as showing
possible bias, despite the highly prejudicial element of
allowing the jury to learn that defendant is insured.
However, on appeal, the verdict for plaintiff was reversed in a 3-2 decision. The majority stated that
"this employment could not possibly serve to show a
greater interest than the admitted status of the witness
as a paid investigator for the defendant itself. It served
only to bring the element of insurance before the
jury." 276 App. Div. at 1014, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
72 See People v. Del Prete, 364 Ill. 376, 4 N.E.2d
484 (1936); State v. Griffen, 218 Iowa 1301, 254 N.W.
841 (1934).
3 People v. Pollock, 25 Cal. App. 2d 440, 444, 77
P.2d 885, 887 (1938).
71People v. Ruiz, 403 Ill.
295, 86 N.E.2d 247 (1949).
See also State v. Leitzke, 206 Iowa 365, 218 N.W. 936
(1928), where the court stated that admissions cannot
do away with the presumption of innocence.
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must soon realize that in so doing it is often allowing the indirect evasion of rules of evidence which,
no doubt, it enforces just as rigidly on other
occasions.
Other decisions reject admissions for far more
rational reasons, perhaps best expressed in the
following words of the Maine Supreme Court:
"It does not lie in the power of one party to
prevent the introduction of relevant evidence
by admitting in general terms the fact which
such evidence tends to prove, if the presiding
justice, in his discretion, deemed it proper to
receive it. Parties, as a general rule, are entitled
to prove the essential facts,--to present to the
jury a picture of the events relied upon. To
substitute for such a picture a naked admission
might have the effect to rob the evidence of
much of its fair and legitimate weight." 75
Later courts have echoed these ideas, and have
upheld a trial judge's refusal to accept a stipulation.76 Not all courts have agreed, however. In
Davis v. State7 it was stated that:
"The purpose of introducing evidence upon
any issue is to establish as a fact the matters
testified to by the witnesses. If the opposite
party admits unqualifiedly in open court the
truth of the matter sought to be established,
78
nothing can be added to it by testimony."
As a general rule, the attitude of the Davis case
appears the more realistic, especially when one
examines some of the issues on which stipulations
have been made and is able to determine just how
effective an admission would be.
Still other decisions have, either explicitly or
implicitly, recognized the general right to exclude
prejudicial evidence by admission but have, in
effect, denied the right by finding some issue,
75 Dunning v. Maine Central R.R., 91 Me. 87. 97.
39 Atl. 352, 356 (1897).
76 See, e.g., State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 15, 258 Pac.
845, 849-50 (1927), where the court stated that "facts,
when admitted, frequently lose their probative ef-

fect.

...

"

106 Tex. Cr. 46, 48, 290 S.W. 163, 164 (1927)
(on motion for rehearing).
78 See also Griffith v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. 465, 467,
169 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1943).
7
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often specious, upon which the evidence is relevant,
and which, so it is said, has become controverted
by the plea of not guilty. No better answer to this
attitude has been found than that contained in
the following words of Lord Sumner:
"Before an issue can be said to be raised, which
would permit the introduction of such evidence
so obviously prejudicial to the accused, it must
have been raised in substance if not in so many
words, and the issue so raised must be one to
which the prejudicial evidence is relevant. The
mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts
everything material in issue is not enough for
this purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the
accused with fancy defences in order to rebut
them at the outset with some damning piece of
prejudice." 79
This creation of issues by the court may sometimes
present the defendant with a situation in which
no effective admission can be made.
It is submitted- that the proper judicial attitude
is found in those cases which grant to the accused
the right to exclude relevant but prejudicial
material by a proper stipulation. The arguments
opposed are, in the main, too doctrinaire and too
indifferent to subtleties of thought to find a respected place in the administration of criminal
justice. And although the avoidance of unnecessary
prejudice is a sufficient reason in itself to give
effect to judicial admissions, an even more persuasive reason exists; it will greatly decrease a practice
indulged in by some prosecutors which can only
cause disrespect for law-the introduction of
prejudicial evidence ostensibly for a proper purpose
but actually with the knowledge, and sometimes
the desire, that it will be improperly used by the
jury. It is to be hoped, therefore, that defense
counsel will make increasing use of judicial admissions on the proper occasions, dnd that if prosecutors will not accept these admissions, the
courts will eventually inform them that they
must.
79Thompson v. The King, [1918] A.C. 221, 232. See
also State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 537-38, 103 Atl.
649, 653 (1918); People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264,
305, 61 N.E. 286, 298-99 (1901).

